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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Bryan L. Straw challenges the district court's order denying his motion to suppress
evidence. Mindful of the case law on abandonment, Mr. Straw nonetheless argues that the
district court erred by denying his motion because the evidence obtained was the fruit of his
unlawful seizure. For this reason, Mr. Straw respectfully requests that this Court reverse or
vacate the district court's order denying his suppression motion, vacate his judgment of
conviction, and remand this case for further proceedings.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Around 8:30 a.m., Officer Mauri approached Mr. Straw's father at a gas station because
the officer did not see a license plate on the father's car. (Tr. Vol. I, 1 p.116, L.20-p.117, L.5.)
Officer Mauri asked Mr. Straw's father about the license plate, and Mr. Straw's father showed
him the temporary registration in the rear windshield. (Tr. Vol. I, p.118, Ls.7-10.) Officer Mauri
then asked if either Mr. Straw or his father were on probation. (Tr. Vol. I, p.118, Ls.12-14.)
Mr. Straw's father told the officer that Mr. Straw was on probation. (Tr. Vol. I, p.118, Ls.14-16.)
Shortly thereafter, Mr. Straw came out of the gas station and walked over to the car. (Tr. Vol. I,
p.118, Ls.17-21.) Officer Mauri clarified with Mr. Straw that he was actually on parole.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.14, Ls.4-11.) Officer Mauri looked at Mr. Straw's identification and did not return
it right away. (Tr. Vol. I, p.32, L.23-p.35, L.6; p.120, Ls.2-5.) Officer Mauri also asked
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The transcript on appeal is divided into three parts. Each part has its own internal pagination.
The first part, not cited herein, contains the preliminary hearing transcript (pages 1 to 62 of
overall document). The second part, cited as Volume I, contains two hearings on Mr. Straw's
motion to suppress (pages 63 to 195 of overall document). The third part, cited as Volume II,
contains the entry of plea and sentencing hearings (pages 196 to 214 of overall document).
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Mr. Straw for consent to search his person. (Tr. Vol. I, p.119, Ls.3--4.) Mr. Straw declined.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.119, Ls.9-11.) Mr. Straw appeared nervous and looked like he was trying to hide
something. (Tr. Vol. I, p.120, Ls.12-21.) Officer Mauri frisked him. (Tr. Vol. I, p.48, Ls.20-24,
p.129, Ls.16-17.) Officer Mauri eventually contacted a parole officer and was instructed to
detain and search Mr. Straw. (Tr. Vol. I, p.123, L.10-p.124, L.4.) At this time, Officer Mauri
told Mr. Straw that he was detaining him. (Tr. Vol. I, p.15, Ls.5-17.) Officer Mauri began to
place Mr. Straw's hands behind his back for the search, but Mr. Straw ran away. (Tr. Vol. I,
p.124, Ls.4-9.) Officer Mauri chased after him. (Tr. Vol. I, p.16, Ls.21-22.) Officer Mauri lost
sight of Mr. Straw a few times during the chase. (Tr. Vol. I, p.21, Ls.16-20.) The police caught
Mr. Straw, and he was arrested for obstructing an officer. (Tr. Vol. I, p.18, Ls.7-11, p.124,
Ls.13-15.) Officer Mauri took him to jail. (Tr. Vol. I, p.18, Ls.13-14.)
Later that day, a third party called the police to report a baggie with a white powder on
his property. (Tr. Vol. I, p.19, Ls.7-10.) The baggie was in the immediate area where Mr. Straw
had run from Officer Mauri. (Tr. Vol. I, p.19, Ls.11-18.) Officer Mauri retrieved the baggie.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.20, Ls.5-6.) It tested positive for methamphetamine. (Tr. Vol. I, p.20, Ls.9-11.)
Officer Mauri went back to the jail to question Mr. Straw about the baggie. (Tr. Vol. I, p.20,
Ls.12-16.) Mr. Straw waived his Miranda 2 rights, and he admitted that he discarded the baggie
when he was running away from Officer Mauri. (Tr. Vol. I, p.20, L.23-p.21, L.12, p.124, Ls.1720.)
The State filed a criminal complaint alleging that Mr. Straw committed the crime of
possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine. (R., pp.10-11.) Mr. Straw also received
a misdemeanor citation for obstructing an officer. (R., p.9.) The magistrate consolidated the
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Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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cases. (R., p.44.) After a preliminary hearing, the magistrate found probable cause for the
offenses and bound Mr. Straw over to district court. (R., p.51.) The State filed an Information
charging Mr. Straw with possession of a controlled substance and obstructing an officer.
(R., pp.59-60.) Later, the district court granted the State's motion to file an Amended

Information that added the persistent violator sentencing enhancement. (R., pp.67-71, 81.)
Mr. Straw filed a motion to suppress. (R., pp.64-65.) In support, Mr. Straw argued that
Officer Mauri seized him without reasonable suspicion, the attenuation doctrine did not apply to
avoid suppression, and Officer Mauri unlawfully arrested him for obstructing an officer.
(R., pp.76-79.) Mr. Straw sought suppression of the baggie containing methamphetamine and his
subsequent statements to Officer Mauri at the jail. (Tr. Vol. I, p.90, Ls.6-12.) The State opposed
the motion and argued that Officer Mauri had a consensual encounter with Mr. Straw until
Officer Mauri told him that he was being detained. (R., p.94.) The State also argued that Officer
Mauri lawfully detained Mr. Straw to search him pursuant to his parole conditions. (R., pp.9496.) Finally, the State argued that the attenuation doctrine applied to the discovery of the
methamphetamine. (R., pp.96-99.)
The district court held two hearings on the motion. (See generally Tr. Vol. I.) The district
court denied his motion. (See Tr. Vol. I, p.112, L.24-p.132, L.1 (district court's factual findings
and legal conclusions).) The district court ruled that the encounter was consensual until Officer
Mauri detained and tried to search Mr. Straw as ordered by his parole officer. (Tr. Vol. I, p.121,
Ls.10-13, p.123, L.21-p.124, L.4, p.128, Ls.22-25.) The district court also ruled that Officer
Mauri had probable cause to arrest Mr. Straw for obstructing an officer once he fled. (Tr. Vol. I,
p.129, L.20-p.130, L.5.) Further, the district court determined that Officer Mauri's actions were
"justified" because Mr. Straw "basically" waived his Fourth Amendment rights as a parolee or,
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alternatively, his "conduct was highly suspicious." (Tr. Vol. I, p.129, Ls.5-11.) Next, the district
court ruled that Mr. Straw terminated the seizure when he fled and he abandoned any possessory
interest in the baggie by discarding it. (Tr. Vol. I, p.130, L.6-p.131, L.7.) Therefore, the district
court would not suppress the baggie. (Tr. Vol. I, p.131, Ls.15-16.) Lastly, the district court ruled
that Mr. Straw's statements would not be suppressed because he received Miranda warnings.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.131, Ls.16-23.) The district court entered an order denying Mr. Straw's motion to
suppress for the reasons stated on the record. (R., p .113.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Straw pled guilty to possess10n of a controlled
substance and obstructing an officer. (R., pp.117, 118.) Mr. Straw reserved his right to appeal the
district court's denial of his motion to suppress. (R., p.118; Tr. Vol. II, p.5, Ls.9-17, 20-21.)
The district court sentenced Mr. Straw to three years, with one and one-half years fixed, for
possession of a controlled substance and credit for time served for obstructing an officer.
(R., p.119; Tr. Vol. II, p.17, Ls.7-10, 23-25.) The district court also retained jurisdiction.
(R., p.119; Tr. Vol. II, p.17, Ls.11-12.) Mr. Straw timely appealed from the district court's
judgment of conviction. (R., pp.120-24 (felony judgment), 126 (misdemeanor judgment); Aug.
R., pp.1-3 (notice of appeal).)
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ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Straw's motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Straw's Motion To Suppress

A.

Introduction
Mindful of the abandonment principles from California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621

(1991), and State v. Zuniga, 143 Idaho 431 (Ct. App. 2006), Mr. Straw maintains that the district
court erred by denying his motion to suppress because the evidence was the fruit of his unlawful
seizure. He submits that, but for the illegal seizure, he would not have fled and Officer Mauri
would not have found the evidence. As such, he argues that the exclusionary rule requires
suppression of the evidence, despite the holdings from Hodari D. and Zuniga on abandonment.

B.

Standard Of Review
The Court uses a bifurcated standard to review a district court's order on a motion to

suppress. State v. Wulff, 157 Idaho 416, 418 (2014). The Court will accept the trial court's
findings of fact "unless they are clearly erroneous." Id. The Court exercises free review over the
"application of constitutional principles in light of those facts." Id.

C.

Mindful of Hodari D. and Zuniga, The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Straw's
Motion To Suppress Because The Evidence Was The Fruit Of The Illegal Seizure
Mr. Straw argues that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress because,

even though he abandoned the baggie during his flight, the baggie and his statements should
have been suppressed as the fruit of the illegal seizure.
"The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects citizens from
unreasonable search and seizure." State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 796 (2003); see also U.S.
CONST. amend. IV. A warrantless seizure is presumptively unreasonable, unless the State shows
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the seizure fits within a well-established exception to the warrant requirement. State v. Green,
158 Idaho 884, 886-87 (2015). The defense has the burden to prove a seizure occurred. State v.
Page, 140 Idaho 841, 843 (2004).
"The test to determine if an individual is seized for Fourth Amendment purposes is an
objective one, evaluating whether under the totality of the circumstances 'a reasonable person
would feel free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter."' State v.
Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 658 (2007) (quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436 (1991)). "A
seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual on the street or
other public place and asks a few questions." State v. Fry, 122 Idaho 100, 102 (Ct. App. 1991)
(citing Bostick, 501 U.S. 429; Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983)). "So long as police do
not convey a message that compliance with their requests is required, the encounter is deemed
'consensual' and no reasonable suspicion is required." Id. On the other hand, a seizure occurs
''when an officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, restrains the liberty of a
citizen." State v. Liechty, 152 Idaho 163, 167 (Ct. App. 2011).
Examples of circumstances that might indicate seizure, even where the person did
not attempt to leave, would be the threatening presence of several officers, the
display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the
citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the
officer's request might be compelled.
Id. at 168 (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)). "The critical
question is whether, taking into account all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter, the
police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that he or she was not at liberty
to ignore the police presence and go about his or her business." State v. Robertson, 134 Idaho
180, 184 (Ct. App. 2000) (citing State v. Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474, 479 (Ct. App. 1999)).
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Here, as argued by his counsel below, Mr. Straw maintains that Officer Mauri seized him
before Officer Mauri obtained any instructions from probation and parole. Mr. Straw argues that,
examining all the circumstances, Officer Mauri' s conduct would have communicated to a
reasonable person that he was not free to ignore the police presence and go about his business.
The circumstances showed:
The officer took, retained, and ran Mr. Straw's identification. The officer falsely
told Mr. Straw that he was actively violating his conditions of parole. The officer
frisked Mr. Straw. The officer controlled Mr. Straw's movements, refusing to
allow him to enter the vehicle, ordering him to keep his hands out of his pockets,
and directing him to remain in a certain area.
(R., p.77.) This encounter lasted twenty minutes before Officer Mauri tried to search Mr. Straw
per his parole officer's request. (Tr. Vol. I, p.91, L.24-p.92, L.1; see also State's Ex. 4, 1:5720:40.) Looking at the totality of the circumstance, no reasonable person in Mr. Straw's position
would feel free to decline Officer Mauri's commands and terminate the encounter. Mindful of
the abandonment case law, discussed below, Mr. Straw argues that Officer Mauri seized him.
Next, Officer Mauri did not have reasonable suspicion of any criminal activity to justify
the seizure. "Under the Fourth Amendment, 'limited investigatory detentions, based on less than
probable cause, are permissible when justified by an officer's reasonable articulable suspicion
that a person has committed, or is about to commit, a crime."' State v. Perez, 164 Idaho 626, 628
(2019) (quoting State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 811 (2009)). "Reasonable suspicion must be
based on specific, articulable facts and the rational inferences that can be drawn from those
facts." State v. Morgan, 154 Idaho 109, 112 (2013) (quoting Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811). "The test
for reasonable suspicion is based on the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at or
before the time of the stop." Id. Here, Officer Mauri admitted that he did not have reasonable
suspicion Mr. Straw committed a crime. (Tr. Vol. I, p.36, Ls.6-12.) As argued by Mr. Straw's
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trial counsel, "It appears the officer simply felt that because Mr. Straw was on parole, the officer
had the right to detain and search him for no reason at all." (R., p.77.) Therefore, the totality of
the circumstances show that Officer Mauri did not have reasonable suspicion to seize Mr. Straw
and thus the seizure was unlawful.
Due to the unlawful seizure, Mr. Straw argues that the district court erred by denying his
motion to suppress. The district court should have suppressed all evidence obtained after
Mr. Straw's illegal seizure. See State v. Cohagan, 162 Idaho 717, 720 (2017) ("The exclusionary
rule requires the suppression of both 'primary evidence obtained as a direct result of an illegal
search or seizure' and, pertinent here, 'evidence later discovered and found to be derivative of an
illegality,' the proverbial 'fruit of the poisonous tree."' (quoting Segura v. United States, 468
U.S. 796, 804 (1984)); see also Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963) (evidence
obtained through unconstitutional police conduct subject to exclusion); Bishop, 146 Idaho at
810-11 (same).
However, Mr. Straw is mindful of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Hodari
D. and the Court of Appeals' decision in Zuniga. In Hodari D., the United States Supreme Court

refused to suppress evidence abandoned by the defendant during his flight from the police.
There, the defendant threw a cocaine rock while he fled from the police. 499 U.S. at 622-23. The
United States Supreme Court first held that the defendant was not seized when he dropped the
drugs. Id. at 624-27. The United States Supreme Court then concluded, "The cocaine abandoned
while he was running was in this case not the fruit of a seizure, and his motion to exclude
evidence of it was properly denied." Id. at 629. In Zuniga, the Court of Appeals also held that
evidence obtained from the defendant's flight was not subject to the exclusionary rule. There, the
police unlawfully detained the defendant, but then the defendant fled. 143 Idaho at 433, 436. The
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defendant dropped contraband during the chase. Id. at 436. The Court of Appeals held that this
evidence was not suppressible because the defendant was not seized when he dropped it. Id. The
Court of Appeals reasoned:
Had he been searched at that time and the methamphetamine found, it would have
been suppressible as fruit of the poisonous tree due to the unlawful detention
without reasonable suspicion. But Zuniga decided to forgo the opportunity to
challenge his seizure at that stage. Instead, he chose to terminate the seizure
through escape from [the officer's] authority. It would be a fiction for us to hold
that Zuniga was still under seizure by [the officer] while he was running away and
no longer submitting or yielding to [the officer's] authority.

Id. The Court of Appeals relied extensively on Hodari D. for its holding. Zuniga, 143 Idaho at
436-37. Mindful of Hodari D. and Zuniga, and the fact that Mr. Straw discarded baggie of
methamphetamine during his flight, he nonetheless argues that the district court erred by denying
his motion to suppress after his illegal seizure.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Straw respectfully requests that this Court reverse or vacate the district court's order
denying his motion to suppress, vacate his judgment of conviction, and remand this case for
further proceedings.
DATED this 26 th day of August, 2019.

Isl Jenny C. Swinford
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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